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INTRODUCTION:
This paper takes it shape around my own personal intrigue with Latin America’s
authoritarian dictators as well as my fascination with the US intelligence community and the
way in which it works with policy-makers. Using Chile in the late 20th century as my case study, I
will dive into the event that reshape not just Chile’s future, but also the future of US foreign
policy. The aim of this is to focus on the inter-governmental contest between the agencies that
make up the intelligence community, chiefly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other
aspects of US diplomacy, mainly the State Department (State).
Focusing on US foreign policy in this manner allows us to take away the more salient
observations and make them broadly applicable. For instance how did the contest between the
CIA and State affect the outcomes of Chile? What I mean by this quite simply how did Nixon
pave the way for General Augusto Pinochet to lead Chile down what is easily its darkest era.
While Gen. Pinochet is not a main character in this piece, he does receive a more formal
introduction later on. The main players here are President Nixon, his Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, Chile’s President Salvador Allende, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the US
Department of State. This paper is primarily concerned with the ways in which the US foreign
policy apparatus tried to handle President Allende and his brand of Marxism.
First and foremost it needs to be recognized that there are many more agencies that
function within this apparatus and even more so within the intelligence community, but for the
purposes of this paper solely State and CIA are used. A specific lense is cast upon State and CIA
here because it appears that throughout President Nixon’s term, one aspect of foreign policy
was favored and one was left out in the sun to dry. I have spent many dozens of hours poring
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over recently declassified State and CIA documents from this time period. Items such as the
Church Hearing testimonies from former DCI Richard Helms, dozens of CIA weekly reports, and
countless other documents have proved incredibly useful. Just because all of this information is
out there publically, and many scholars have done their own research on it does not mean the
answer is black and white. As you will see, it is actually quite the opposite.
Scholar Pete Kornbluh has dedicated his entire life to preserving the memory of the
Chileans who were persecuted and eventually killed during the regime of Gen. Pinochet and
unearthing the horrible atrocities the country of Chile faced during this time. Through his work
many of these documents came to see the light, and his work is primarily focused on the years
after the military dictatorship had been established. It is the purpose of my work to be able to
highlight the inter-governmental conflict between the State Department and CIA, how
President Nixon selectively used his available foreign policy tools to help foment a climate that
only exacerbated the increasingly volatile internal setting that Allende had been dealing with,
as well as the way in which foreign policy develops with the collaboration of intelligence and
formal diplomacy organs.
It is here that I combine my love of Latin American politics and culture with my passion
for the study of intelligence and the way in which the intelligence community interacts with one
another as well as with policy-makers. What intrigues me most about these years is the way in
which the US handled the situation from one year to the next, mainly the way in which
sequential presidents handled it. To begin with, a bit of background is needed starting with the
Kennedy – Frei years which preceded the Nixon – Allende years. Next I move into a more
precise questioning of the US intelligence community before the 1970 election and why the
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president did not take stock of the intelligence that was presented to him. Finally I move into a
discussion about the way in which President Nixon fostered a climate that made a coup
possible. That although the US did not actively initiate or support the coup, they certainly did
not reject the idea nor did they do anything to prevent it.
Nixon was also coming into office when the threat of Soviet expansion was evident
around the world and the pressure to contain it was at an all-time high. When viewing Chile in
the context of the broader Latin American region it becomes easier for us to understand that
Nixon was more concerned with the spread of Communism through the region as a whole. So
when a democratically elected president comes to power on a Marxist platform, the President
is sure to respond. The US was threatened by the emergence of another possible Castro-esq
regime in the region lest of all risk the election of this regime encourage other countries to
follow suit. In reality, I find it unwise to support the claim the Allende would have turned out
like Castro did given the fact that Allende wanted to maintain positive and healthy relations
with the United States. Despite his policy programs promoting the nationalization of his
countries mineral resources Allende was not as dedicated to the Communist ideologies as
Castro was. It is true though that some of Allende’s UP members were very keen on the idea of
violent revolution in Chile, but Allende did not necessarily see eye to eye with these members.
CHAPTER 1: PROPER PLANNING FOR 1964 ELECTION
1.1 – KENNEDY AND FREI
There has been much debate about the who’s, what’s, and why’s of the Chilean coup
that saw the first democratically-elected Marxist President of a Latin American country come
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crumbling down. Then-President Nixon was no fan of the new leader and did not hesitate to
show his distaste for the new regime, but funny enough, the story behind American
intervention in Chile goes back well before the Nixon administration. Best stated by the
notorious General Ugarte Pinochet, who’s violent coup led to the death of Allende and the
introduction of one of the bloodiest authoritarian regimes the world has ever seen; “…the
drama had begun long before September 4, 1970…” 1. What is significant about this statement is
the understanding and acceptance that the climate that eventually fostered the coup had been
a long time coming for Chileans. It will become apparent that over time, Allende happened to
not apply pressures in the right spots to deal with various mounting pressures within society.
Long before the election of Salvador Allende in 1970, when Chile suffered its own
horrific 9/11 events. Long before Nixon was elected, President Kennedy and his administration
had realized the significance of Chilean relations and were warned of its place in history, both
for the US and for the entirety of Latin America. The United States was involved on a massive
scale in the 1964 presidential election in Chile. The Special Group authorized over $3 million
during the 1962-19642 period to prevent the election of a Socialist or Communist candidate.
This operation became known as a spoiling campaign. The groundwork for this was laid early in
1961, by establishing relationships with key political parties and creating antiSocialist/Communist propaganda, as well as initiating mechanisms that had the ability to
mobilize and influence large sectors of the population. Projects that range back to the 1950’s,
such as those conducted among the peasants, slum dwellers, students, and the media provided

A. Pinochet, The Crucial Day: September 11, 1973 (Santiago 1982) p. 15
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, 94th Cong., 1st sess., December 18, 1975s, 14
1
2
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a large basis for much of this kind of pre-election work. In 1962, the Special Group approved
$230,000 for the support of Christian Democrat (PDC) candidate Eduardo Frei, as well as an
extra $20,000 in support of the Radical Party (PR). Moving ahead now, in May of 1964, the
Special Group approved $160,000 to support PDC slum dwellers and peasant organizations 3.
As a result of all the funds thrown into the PDC and Frei, he wins the presidential election and
in September of 1964 is elected president with 55.7% of the vote, while Allende finishes a
distant second with 38.9%. According to the Congressional Report, Allende is quoted in a NY
Times article from November 15th of 1965, saying that the US was among “certain outside
forces”4 that had led to his defeat. This is significant because of the exposure of the US’ hand in
this election, elections that historically had been democratically sound.
While one of the most apparent instances of US involvement in any single country’s
domestic politics during the 20th century would undoubtedly fall on the Chilean Coup-era in the
1970’s, the actual intervention could date back to as early as the 1960’s. There is no question
that the US’ hand in the Chilean Coup and the overthrow of the Salvador Allende regime is one
of the most heinous instances of US involvement in foreign politics. But what is surprising, is
that the first sign of US involvement dates back to the Kennedy Administration, not the Nixon
years. A little background history; in 1962 the leader of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
Eduardo Frei, received $50,0005 from the US’ Special Group which is responsible for overseeing
US covert operations. While the PDC ran on a Marxist platform, the support and backing from

Ibid., 57
Ibid., 57
5 Ibid., 57
3
4
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the US makes sense considering the party was staunchly anticommunist. Looking ahead now to
the preparation for the 1964 election, where in 1962 the Special Group approves an additional
$180,000 to strengthen the PDC. Around this time, while the CIA and the Special Committee
were figuring out which parties to support in order to align the soon-to-be Chilean president
with US national interests, President Kennedy organized the Business Group for Latin America
(which in 1970 becomes the Council of the Americas). The aim of this group was to promote US
corporate interests in the region, and bring in foreign investments into the country. What this
group did, that the various US agencies could not necessarily do, for fear of exposure, was
channel funds into Chile in the way they saw fit; in a way that would benefit them. This business
group, especially in the case of Chile, was created to promote foreign investment in the region,
mainly by US corporations.
The CIA and State Department conducted a wide variety of operations during the 1964
Chile presidential election and campaign period, which, according to the 1975 Congressional
Report, range from "organizing slum dwellers to passing funds to political parties." 6 The same
report describes U.S. covert action in Chile in 1964 as a "scare campaign which relied heavily on
images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads.”7. In April of 1965 the Special Group authorizes
the expenditure of $3,000,0008 in an attempt to ensure a victory for Eduardo Frei, the head of
the Christian Democrats, in the upcoming September elections. The effort consisted of direct
financial support for Frei, as well as an all-out anticommunist propaganda campaign. Not just
the CIA, but the State Department as well shared in the rise of the Frei government. In a

Ibid., 14
Ibid., 15
8 Ibid., 15
6
7
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memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary of State from Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, dated July 1968 denotes the “recommendation of an Embassy election
team made up of State and CIA personnel”9. This document notes that Ambassador Korry will
lead a team within the Embassy in Santiago, that will be working in concert with CIA operatives
for the support of the Frei regime. Now it differs from some CIA documents that might appear
contradictory. In many of the CIA documents that mention this time period, there is no direct
mention of State Department personnel for some of the more detailed covert operations. It is
hinted at indirectly that the CIA had gotten approval from the Special Group as a result of
Agency cooperation with State, but it is never explicitly said. It appears that from the State
document I mentioned above, that State was well aware of the situation in Chile and displayed
the disfavor of Allende as well. In a telegram10 from the Embassy in Santiago to the State
Department dated November 1964, State officials met with President Frei and members of his
administration to discuss the increased US assistance to his country.
The two teams discussed the loan/aid package Chile was receiving and discussed the
balance of payments and debt his country still owed. While there is slight contradiction, it
seems reasonable to say that there very well could have been certain activities that only the CIA
handled, and some in which the two agencies could function together. For instance the CIA
documents regarding the propaganda campaign and covert activities to promote Frei’s
presidency during his campaign mention approval by the Special Group, but does not

Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 71, 7/12/68. Secret; Eyes Only.
Initialed for Oliver by Sayre
10 National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) 8 Chile.
Confidential; Immediate. Passed to the White House
9
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necessarily say that State Department officials were tied to this. This could be significant in
terms of planning an escape route in case the US was found out; plausible deniability. If only
CIA members were aware of these plans it would be easier to sweep under the carpet. So let
the State Department handle the overt support, the channeling of loans and financial aid to
improve the Chilean economy, and leave the covert propaganda to the CIA.
1.2 – IMPACT OF TIMELY INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY
In the 1964 presidential election in which Eduardo Frei won, the US played an active
role in supporting his campaign and ensuring his victory. Support was channeled to his Christian
Democrat party through various intermediaries. But despite the initial help from the US, Frei’s
PDC grew increasingly polarized towards the end of his tenure. In a Board of National Estimates
report11 it is said that not only was Frei’s coalition deteriorating, but also that if the CIA were to
support the PDC, they should be wary of the potential fragmentation in the PDC. Adding to this,
the Staff Report to Study Governmental Operations “concludes that U.S. intervention enabled
Eduardo Frei to win a clear majority in the 1964 election, instead of merely a plurality” 12. It is
important to note here that the US intelligence community was well aware of the difference
between plurality and majority in Chilean elections, which will be important distinction for the
1970 election.
The salient piece to take away from the Kennedy years and its impact on Chilean politics
can be seen in the proper use of timely intelligence. What I mean by this is that with a President

Board of National Estimates, “Chilean Problems and Frei’s Prospects,” Special Memorandum, March 4,
1968, in CIA, “Chile Collection.”
12 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, 94th Cong., 1st. sess., December 18, 1975, 17
11
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who will listen, and an intelligence community who is well apt to give the President everything
he needs to make a decision, the US can be effective in its policies. The Kennedy years fully
illustrate a cohesive and well-oiled foreign policy machine; one in which the CIA is working with
the State Department and vice-versa. The activities that the US engaged in were the proper
mixture of covert activities and proper diplomacy, and in the end, the US succeeded in installing
Frei. While the Kennedy Administration was reveling in their win in Chile, they did not fully
realize the effects of their work, and the world would not fully see the divide in Chile until the
1970 election.
CHAPTER 2: A POLARIZED CHILE
Chile as a result of its long and rich democratic history was not as ripe for the revolution
that Nixon and his administration had thought. On the other hand, it could be said that the way
the political parties in Chile were split, a civil war was much more likely. It is true though, that in
the 1970 presidential election many of the votes cast were for candidates who were offering
the Chilean people “radical” change. Commentators are quick to use the numbers from Allende
(36%) and Tomic’s (28%) votes to say that much of the population preferred the radical change
that not only Allende was offering, but also the same PDC change that Frei had initiated during
his tenure. In 1964 Eduardo Frei was elected president and he ran from the Christian Democrat
Party (PDC). Allende was a bit like Frei, as both wanted to give Chile “change”, they differed in
the degrees by which this change would come. Frei wanted to undergo the “Chileanization” 13 of
US owned copper interests as well as economic stabilization and a more equitable distribution

13Ibid.,

pg. 5

15
of wealth. The way this program differs from Allende’s “Nationalization” of the same interests
can be seen in that whereas Frei wanted 51% Chilean control of copper mining, Allende wanted
100% Chilean control. Frei did achieve much during his tenure and was able to garner the
support of the peasant class which made up a great deal of the Chilean population at the time.
These peasants were encouraged by the agrarian-reform policies that Frei had pushed in his
campaign, but it was a little bit too good to be true. Frei failed on numerous accounts. He failed
to achieve the amounts of land redistribution, saw a rise in inflation, as well as increased taxes
on the middle class, and as a result his PDC would soon lose support for the upcoming election.
In a CIA memo from 1968, William Broe denotes the complexities of Chilean politics, and
highlights US knowledge of such a ripple in the current;
“the Christian Democrats have encountered increasing difficulty in both the economic and
political fields. Inflation which was reduced in the first two years of the Frei administration from
a level of about 39% to 17% a year has begun to climb again. In 1967 the rate was 21%. Perhaps
even more important than a deteriorating economic situation has been the development of a
leftist trend within the non-Communist political parties and a growing political isolation of
the Frei administration.”14
It is here that the political isolation of the left-of-center group, the Radical Party, and the rightof-center group, the National Party, feel at odds with Frei and are more willing to collaborate
with the FRAP.
As we can see from the CIA memo there was a general knowledge by the US intelligence
community that Frei was failing his country and change was inevitable. But equally so, Secretary

Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 79–00207A, [file name not declassified] Political and
Economic 1968. Secret
14
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of State Dean Rusk in a conversation with Ambassador Tomic in 1968 15 asks the senator on his
thoughts about the economic turmoil in his country. Tomic responds that “the situation in Chile
was very confused”, that “the moderates within the Radical party were not in control of the
party machinery; that the Right was generally discredited and there were many divisions in the
non-communist Left. It is necessary that a new combination of forces be brought into being
which is not based upon the leadership of an individual, (caudillismo or personalismo) but
which expresses the needs and aspirations of the Chilean people”. Tensions within the ruling
PDC party came to full fruition in May of 1969 when the party’s national committee reject the
demands of its left-wing faction and many hardliners of the PDC declared this proposal as a
rebel campaign.
It is here that the PDC chose their candidate for the 1970 election. It is important to
note that the Socialist and Communist groups in the PDC would not support Tomic’s campaign.
Radomiro Tomic was the PDC candidate and hopeful heir to the throne. He inherited most of
Frei’s support, but as one would expect, he caught much more of the backlash too. When a
president from a certain party fails to deliver on his promises, it is easy to assume that a
candidate running under the same party line will have an uphill battle all the way. After Frei’s
failure, and the announcement of Tomic as the PDC candidate, the PDC became so
fractionalized, and two new parties arose out of it. The Unified Popular Action Movement
(MAPU) and the Christian Left (IC) broke off from the conventional PDC and joined the UP
party. Banding together, the Socialists, Communists, Radical and MAPU parties pledged to:

National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL17 CHILE–US.
Confidential.
15
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“fight imperialism, the bourgeoisie, and large landowners. The parties also stressed the
importance of nationalizing large mining firms, accelerating agrarian reform policies and
expropriating large monopolistic firms”16
As the divide deepened, some PDC members actively sought to remove members of
Congress so that Allende would not be able to win the Congressional vote. But, as I was saying,
the PDC split was noticeable enough that the CIA became aware of it early, shown by the July
1970 report17. There were Centrists within the PDC who favored opening up to the Left and
there were Centrists who were more inclined to align with right-wing groups and ideologies.
There actually was a time when the entirety of the PDC was going to align itself with Allende
and the UP, but a consensus was unable to be reached and Allende’s campaign rhetoric and
soon to be unfulfilled promises further polarized the Centrists. This is significant because where
before these Centrists were at least somewhat part of the mix, they now felt cheated and
neglected by Allende.
However, knowing the way in which the Chilean elections are structured make the
picture far less drastic as it may first appear. The Chilean Constitution states that if no clear
candidate is elected then it is ultimately decided by the Congress based upon the two leading
candidates. The takeaway from this is that Allende did not win a clear vote. Jorge Alessandri
who represented the Right obtained only one and four-tenths of a percentage point fewer
votes than Allende. This shows that the population in Chile, while some inclined to pursue
radical change, some were also content with the way the country had been previously going.

Lester Sobel and Chris Hunt, eds., Chile and Allende (New York, NY: Facts on File Inc., 1974). 19
Central Intelligence Agency, Chiles Election -- the Candidates and Their Programs, report no. 0525/70
(Directorate of Intelligence, 1970), accessed April 25, 2018,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0.pdf.
16
17
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Now it also needs to be said that the composition of Allende’s Popular Unity party while
unique, is not necessarily troublesome for the US. In fact, only the Socialist portion were
troublesome. As former Ambassador Korry stated “the Communist party of Chile was the
largest, best-led, influential Communist party in the hemisphere”18, and he is absolutely right.
The Communist Party of Chile was an established part of the Chilean political system, and with
a direct affiliation to the Soviet Union, it strongly believed in a peaceful coexistence with other
world powers as well as approached domestic reform through proper and legal means. It is for
this reason as well as their longstanding roots in Chilean politics, that the Communist party
should understand the difficulties and obstacles that inhibit any kind of rapid transformation of
society. The background and history of the Chilean political system is necessary for one to
understand that Allende was not going to be the next Castro. Allende’s Socialist party origins lie
in the various forms of revolutionary Marxism, meaning anarchism and the shared belief that
Communists were too conservative to abide to any revolutionary promises. While Allende
headed the UP, he was far more comfortable with his disciplined, realistic Communist allies
than of his rash and revolution-crazy party members.
The Chilean Communists preached consolidation and a deal with the PDC, as well as
mediation with the US. Allende did encourage the Marxists, by giving them falsified campaign
promises from not just this election, but all three of his preceding campaigns. In a way, Allende
opened a door that not only could he not close, but he must have lost the key for it too. His
democratic victory gave the Socialists hope that their revolution was emerging, and as a result,

Interview with William F. Buckley, Jr., broadcast on Firing Line(PBS), September 29, 1974; published
as The Truth About Chile (Dinex Mineral, Santiago de Chile, 1974).
18
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social disorder began to run amuck. According to a CIA Weekly Summary on “The Marxist
Government in Chile” that was released in December 2006, but written in December 1970, the
Agency notes that following his election, Allende was faced with a “bitter internal struggle for
power among the factions of his coalition” 19
Allende did in fact promote certain policies in many of his previous campaigns, that
would have given all these different groups hope and enabled him to rally them to his cause. In
reality Allende only partially followed through on his campaign promises. As one could expect,
the floating middle, meaning the members of the Christian Democratic constituency who
favored opening to the Left and members who had more right-wing inclinations was now
decisively split. Allende’s policies simply gave the polarization of the Right a far more lethal
reality, one that now could be mobilized quickly into a true threat to Allende. The true split can
be seen in the way the Socialists, Communists, and other leftist parties believed the President
should run the country. The parties that unified around Allende had such differing philosophies
that it makes it hard to defend the claim that Allende would have seriously pursued the path of
revolutionary Marxism that some of his Socialist backers favored.
2.1 – WHY DIDN’T THE US TAKE MORE STOCK IN CHILE?
When viewing the situation in Chile it is necessary to realize the switch in policy the US
undertook. Trying to understand this switch in policy deems it necessary to realize that the US
as an entity, meaning all the various agencies and branches that subset it, at the end of the day
take their actions based on the president and his views. In the testimony of former DCI Richard

Central Intelligence Agency, The Marxist Government in Chile: Its Evolution, Realization, and
Prospects, Weekly Summary Special Report 43, [pg. 5].
19

20
Helms, to the Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations, in September of 1975,
Helms notes the importance of taking action well before it is too late. He acknowledges that in
the early ‘60’s when the Kennedy Administration wanted to back Eduardo Frei, it was so done
so “a year or two before the election…” and with resources well “enough in advance so they
actually did some good”20 What Helms is referring to is the extensive planning, in terms of
money and support, that is needed so that covert operations of this sort can achieve the
intended result. The intelligence apparatus that makes up the US’ intelligence community,
meaning the FBI, CIA, NSA, Homeland Security, etc., all act within a larger umbrella of US
foreign policy and these agencies, while all handling different aspects of US/world intelligence,
have to take barking orders from someone.
As is also the case with all of these agencies, is that the agendas will fluctuate depending
upon who is in office. For instance, when Kennedy was in office, he was very adamant about
support Frei and he made so very clear early on in his election campaign. Whereas when the
Nixon Administration realized that Allende could cause some serious problems for US and Latin
American relations, the necessary actions were taken a bit too late. It is also important to note
that it is not because the US did not realize what was going on in Chile during this time, just that
policymakers were too busy with other things to heed the intelligence agencies warnings.
When looking at a memorandum titled Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action
Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election by the CIA, we learn that the

Hearing Held before Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities (1975) (statement of Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms). [pg. 15]
20
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US intelligence community was well aware whom the “main candidates would probably be” 21.
So the US intel community knew that the support for Allende was far higher than previously
believed, and in this document they try to ration out what kind of covert action to take to try to
sway the election in the US’ favor. It is said in bullet-three, that a joint Embassy/Station
proposal for a campaign directed against Allende was submitted to the 303 Committee. This
proposal was submitted in December of 1969. What is important from this, is the cohesion
between the State Department and CIA. The inclusion of “Embassy/Station”, shows that both
agencies were utilizing all their tools to work together on this matter. So, as it seems, in the
earlier phases of the planning, both were in the loop. This is rather important to note that both
the CIA and State Department were working in unison on this matter.
Later in the same memorandum, it is noted that on March 5, 1970 a similar proposal
was resubmitted and it now reflected the State/CIA consensus that the US government should
not support any candidate individually, for fear of the backlash. Inside the memorandum, it is
apparent that while State and CIA officials were working together on this matter, but were not
in total agreement about what steps should be taken. State officials seem more apprehensive
about US involvement in any way, but it is stated that both agencies agreed that “spoiling
actions”22 should be taken against the Popular Unity electoral front. This proposal was
ultimately approved in March by the 40 Committee. I think it is also important to note that the
US was very wary of the pressures being exerted on US businesses and government for direct
funding of the Alessandri and Tomic forces. While much of the actual numbers and names in

Central Intelligence Agency, Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Involvement in the September
1970 Chilean Presidential Elections (Washington, DC, 1970), pg. 1
22 Ibid., pg.2
21
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this document are blacked out, which is routine for documents of this security level, it is stated
that roughly $1.1 million in foreign business funds went to the Alessandri campaign. As I just
said, the exact name of whom gave the money and the exact amount are unknown, it is noted
that these funds were given from the US business community to protect US concerns in Chile.
What we can gather from this is that the US business community was worried about the
land reform programs that Allende had proposed in his campaign as it would take land and
ultimately revenue away from US corporations. So while we can see from this document that
the other campaigns were receiving covert funds from the US business community, the US
government was not directly involved in channeling funds to either candidate. It is said that
“This meeting did not give any further serious consideration to direct support to either Tomic or
Alessandri.”23. In the same document it is noted that “should the tone or content become proAlessandri rather than anti-UP, our support will cease.”24The last thing to make mention of
from this memorandum, is that the notion of Phase II was designed to influence a sufficient
number of members of congress to “vote in a manner which will assure that he is denied the
presidency”25
According to a memorandum for the 40 Committee, titled Political Action Related to
1970 Chilean Presidential Election indicates that “on 19 January 1970 representatives of State
and CIA…met to discuss the current political situation in Chile and the covert action operations
which were being conducted or proposed to reduce the chance of a UP victory” 26. In this

Ibid., pg.5
Ibid., pg.8
25 Ibid., pg.6
26 Central Intelligence Agency, Political Action Related to 1970 Chilean Presidential
Election (Washington, DC, 1970), [pg. 1]
23
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document a brief overview of the political parties in Chile and their polling popularity are noted.
The document also establishes the why and how covert action was desired in this case, and
what the intelligence community was thinking of Chilean society and politics at the time. This
same memorandum makes note that the 40 Committee authorized the covert contacts with
members of one political party (ambiguity because this portion of the document is blacked out).
But the goal of this authorization was to enable the moderate Radicals within the party to gain
more influence.
According to this document the action taken by the CIA and State Department to help
influence these parties had failed by and large. The hopeful effect of this covert action was to
reduce the chance of the party moving closer to a merger with the Communists and Marxists.
This is what is meant by it failed; “this trend was confirmed during the July 1969 convention
when dissident moderates were purged from the PR hierarchy”27. While a good amount of this
document is blacked out, so the exact amount of funds being given and names of people who
were being assisted are unknown, it is evident that the CIA and State Department were heavily
involved in Chilean politics during this time and that Ambassador Korry was the main proprietor
of this action. Seeing how Ambassador Korry was the main boots-on-the-ground in a sense, so
he had a good amount of pull in the early years since it was after all his home turf.
Korry also agreed to two other proposals to assist the PDR. This first effort consisted of
financing some kind of trip (blacked out so details are vague) in order to undercut PR and UP
strength. The purpose of these trips were to also try to rally Radical voters to unite against the
UP. The second effort was more of a direct payment to a PDR staff member so that he can
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“maintain an office to be used for party work”28. What is very important and significant of this
level of covert action, which is very apparent in this early document, is that the CIA and State
Department wanted to reduce electoral support for the PR and Allende. They did not want it to
become “a vehicle for promoting Alessandri’s candidacy”29. This is super significant because it
shows that in the early stages of this era, the US was very aware of any kind of affiliation and
direct support for other Chilean parties. The US did not want to become a promoter of Chilean
politics, this would have been bad press and could lead to serious controversy, so the action
was to be directed towards the undermining of Allende’s support rather than the promoting
support for Alessandri or others.
The ultimate recommendations proposed at the end of this document are very telling of
the level of US support and intervention. The US realized that support for Tomic or Alessandri
would be a dead-end and it is stated that it would take a serious amount of financing and
support to be able to make Tomic a real contender in the election. But what is also made note
of is that the platform on which Tomic would run, would “indicate that a government led by
him would be apt to take some actions not consonant with US interests” 30. So clearly the US is
very much thinking of the long-term strategic aspect of who to support in leading Chile. What is
also very indicative of US sentiments towards Allende are heavily viewed in a Cold War-esq
lense. It is said towards the end of the document that “Based on Allende’s own views, plus the
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public platform of the UP, we must assume that an Allende victory would mean the emergence
of a Castro-type government in Chile.”31.
CHAPTER 3: NIXON YEARS
3.1 – NIXON AND KISSINGER
Looking back on the Kennedy era, and the mechanisms that were established to ensure
Frei’s victory, we now know that some of the usefulness of these assets were “limited for their
increased visibility”32. This is increasingly important if we are to try to distinguish why the Nixon
administration did what it did. By not having sound means of intervening it becomes more clear
why Tracks I & II were established. Much of the scare campaign that happened during Allende’s
campaign had not played out the way the US had hoped. While this propaganda campaign did
not succeed in preventing Allende from taking office, it had several key impacts in the years
following his election. Many of the aspects of mass mobilization and the ideologies that had
been planted in the Chilean mind during this campaign, only intensified after Allende’s actual
election. The groups that the US chose to covertly fund and support soon became more of a
behemoth than the US had previously thought. The media that was at risk of being cut under
Allende soon became a prominent focal point of many of the issues that radical and
revolutionary Chileans had voiced.
In 1967 Allende founds the Organization of Latin American Solidarity, which is a coalition
of leftists groups, and Henry Kissinger is quoted as claiming that it was “Havana based” and
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“dedicated to armed struggle against the United States” 33. This is one of the long line of
statements that Dr. Kissinger made during his tenure, and it should be evident enough that he
had serious qualms with the Chilean political leader Salvador Allende. In a memorandum titled
Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean
Election34 it is noted that on March 5, 1970 there was a State Department and CIA consensus
that the US Government should not take up support for any one candidate, rather should
engage in spoiling operations against the Popular Unity (UP) front and their candidate, Allende.
On March 25th these actions were approved by the 40 Committee and furthermore, the plans
took cognizance of the possible need to directly support one candidate if the prospect of an
Allende victory was dawning. In the summary of this memorandum it is noted that there is a
“tradition of seven years involvement with the elements of the Chilean polity” 35, but it is also
noted that the “independent nature” of the Alessandri machine works against any serious
considerations the CIA had for supporting the party. What this shows is that the CIA and State
Department were wary of the poor structure of Alessandri’s campaign, and did not want to
directly fund/support him for fear of overexposure and fear of being found out. What this
document also shows, is that the Agency and State were working together, if not at the very
least sharing information and opinions in response to the Chilean situation.
Examining this topic and the multiple complexities of the Chilean case, there is a
necessity to highlight the role that both President Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry
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Kissinger played. This one aspect touches upon the reasons why the US intelligence community
acted the way it did and show us a great deal about the way the intelligence community
interacts with policy-makers; which is a huge takeaway from this whole project. President Nixon
came into office after President Kennedy and as a result carried a different view of foreign
policy with him. Nixon came into office on the platform to end the war in Vietnam. As a result
of this, his foreign policy centered around the fight for Asia, which makes sense. But the
president of a world power and a man in his unique position needs to take the uttermost care
when handling certain world events. Looking back on what transpired in Chile with Allende and
then eventually with Pinochet, we can safely say that had Nixon and his administration focused
on properly handling Chile, possibly through a more diplomatic, more overt manner, then
certain event might not have unfolded.
Obviously this is speculation as we cannot simply say decisively one way or another
what or what could have happened. But when presidents do not actively take full stock of the
gathered intelligence, they are at fault. Additionally, Nixon chose to exclude the State
Department and Ambassador Korry from the decision-making process let alone even the
planning process. This is telling of the kind of diplomatic muscle that Nixon wanted to exercise
over Chile. This perfectly shows the presidents favoritism for and usage of the intelligence
community and their vast resources over the State Department and more formal diplomacy.
Even the manner in which the US intelligence community viewed a coup in Chile in 1973
is telling of the way the intelligence community works towards a Presidents desired agenda. In
early August of that year the CIA stated in an intelligence memorandum that “Army
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Commander Prats remains the prime obstacle. He is so strongly opposed to a coup”36 At this
present moment, the US intelligence community believes a coup is unwise and that it would not
only fail miserably if attempted. But what is even more important is that they realize that a
coup would only strengthen Allende and solidify his interior cabinet. Also possibly making the
military come to their senses and rejoin the cabinet forces without getting the requested
privilege to make policy decisions, which was the main reason why the military did not want to
rejoin the Allende government. What this document highlights is that the US intelligence
community was aware that any direct contact with the Chilean military would be a dead end.
Without top officials pressing for the overthrow of Allende, the military would not budge. It is
at this point that the Nixon Administration realizes that too much effort could be costly and
blow up in their face. So even despite plenty of early-warnings, and even late ones that the
Presidents hopes for a coup was realistically not feasible, the President still went on with his
policy of doing anything possible to wreak havoc upon Chile.
3.2 – NIXON’S MINDSET
The case for Chile is an increasingly interesting one, more so than any other country in
Latin America in terms of the effect of US and Soviet policies. Eduardo Frei Montalva, Salvador
Allende, Augusto Pinochet each represented a position in world politics. The same has not
happened with Argentine rulers, nor Peruvian ones. In a certain way the APRA of Peru and
Peronism in Argentina are local phenomenon. It would be difficult for them to have taken on
the connotations of Chilean leaders who assumed international ideologies or outlooks. It is in
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this context, of competing worldviews and ideologies that makes Chilean leaders and politics so
interesting. The inflows of US support, mainly monetary support for Chilean political parties
reached astonishing heights in the 1960s through the ‘70s. In 1970, about $425 thousand were
approved to be sent to non-Marxist candidates and then in 1971 another $3,577,000 was sent
to similar candidates. The way in which the US tried to do anything and everything in their
power to be able to ensure a candidate of their choosing would win the election proves that the
US was more concerned with promoting anti-Marxist/communist ideals and leaders. The way in
which two worlds collided, making the country its stomping ground for both Soviet and
American policy, makes Chile a clear example of the way foreign policy affected the results of
domestic politics.
As Lawrence Weschler writes:
“The enemy -- the International Communist Movement -- is perceived as covertly operating
everywhere, all the time, in all fields of human endeavor. The threat is no longer conceived as
one of conventional war, nor even as one of sedition (the doctrine's word for armed
insurrection), but rather as one of subversion”37
This truly was the perceived enemy during the 1970’s for almost all military dictatorships in
Latin America. Within this mindset one can understand why these dictators chose to form this
intelligence system. What also needs to be understood within this context of international
communism, is the strong domestic insurrections that made many Latin American leaders
uneasy. Not only did it trouble these leaders, but even more so, it made the US very concerned
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for the fate of the region. Taking into account the Cold War era mentality of the US, especially
with Cuba being a Soviet satellite, the US was more than happy to assist these nations in
tracking and hunting down known communist sympathizers and ensuring the longevity of these
dictatorships.
The use of covert operations are some of the more atypical forms of foreign policy the
US chooses to engage in. Most foreign aid is given through organizations like USAID, with the
intent of the US being the promotion of civil society or the strengthening of political parties.
This type of clandestine action is controversial to say the least. It is not a proper, let alone
democratic, form of foreign policy. Covert action should be used as a last resort, an end-all-beall option. What this shows is that democracy really was not the goal in the end. The manner in
which these operations were set up and carried out and the level of CIA assistance, combined
with the true political disregard for things such as human rights show that combatting
communism in the region and ensuring Latin American dictators who will align with US interests
was the true goal.
What they mean by this is that while many were backing him, such as the media and
universities that were highly influenced by the Communists and Socialists. But many wealthy
and influential Chileans felt threatened by Allende’s proposed policies. So these individuals took
it upon themselves to get rid of Allende. But, this coup attempt against Allende never really got
off the ground and the shooting of the commander in chief of the army, two days before the
election, turned out to be a huge advantage for Allende. For this, the US did not have any say in
this matter, it was totally on the Chileans, but the US soon realized the negative affects this
would have as the Chilean public was outraged and shocked at the attempt, and the
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assassination actually united the politically divided armed forces behind Allende’s legal right to
the presidency. So once in office, Allende quickly moved to consolidate and named Communists
and Socialists to key cabinet positions. Within the language of the CIA document it is evident
that the Agency felt threatened by Allende’s election. Towards the end of the document it
mentions Chile’s recognition of Cuba under Allende, and his improved relations with places like
Albania, East Germany and North Korea, which demonstrates the fear the US had of a new and
democratically elected Castro, in the once model Latin American democracy.
Viewing the Chilean situation in the shadow of the Cuban and Castro era, should not be
seen as controversial, despite it being problematic. Intelligence agencies are not fortune tellers,
they do not predict the future with 100% certainty. They are meant to look at ongoing
situations and developments, in lieu of history. They are to use historical facts, to try to
understand ongoing political developments and try to draw connections or interpret reasons
for the how and why present situations play out. So while it is problematic the intelligence
community used Cuban infiltration as a bit of a scapegoat for much of the developments in
Chile, it is not to be seen as incorrect. There is an inherent issue in the intelligence community
with faulty intelligence or faulty analysis. This is not to say it is wrong, for at the time it is being
done, they believed it to be true. Only in retrospect can we say it is wrong. According to the
Background for Chilean Hearings from March 1972 38, it is noted that Beatriz Allende, the
President’s daughter, was married to Luis Fernandez Ona, who was among the Cuban officials
that belonged to the Cuban Intelligence Service. Now while this could just be true-love at its
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finest, it is also noted in this CIA document that since Allende’s inauguration, the Cuban official
presence has gone from zero personnel to around 5439.
Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying in the Congressional Report 40 that if Allende were
elected president, he will establish some kind of Communist government. But even this being
said, it is so rash of Kissinger, and telling of his and the president’s wishes for Allende’s Chile to
equate Allendes administration as that of Castro in Cuba. What it comes down to is that while
the Soviet Communist party might be inclined to support Communist parties all over the world,
that does not necessarily mean that social revolution is ripe. In the National Intelligence
Estimates in Section IV of the 1975 Congressional Report, it is said that these more extreme
fears were ill founded. The Report finds that “there was never a significant threat of a Soviet
military presence; the export of Allende’s revolution was limited” 41. So here we see a clear
disconnect between top level policy-makers, and the intelligence apparatus. Kissinger and
Nixon let their fear of Communist inroads in Latin America, which is understandable, they did
not take proper steps to further analyze/digest intelligence material on the issue. If they would
have, they would have seen that Allende was not Castro, nor was his brief time in office even
close to that of its Cuban neighbor.
3.3 – WHO AUTHORIZES THE CIA?
The 40 Committee during this time plays the overall team-role in many ways. It is
comprised of the Chairman who acts as the quarterback, and his various positions intent on
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delivering him success, in any way is possible. It does not matter how you score a goal, so long
as the ball goes in the net. The Committee was made up primarily of CIA officials, as well as key
military personnel like the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and even the Attorney
General John Mitchell sat on as a personal friend to Nixon. During the latter half of Track I a
different working group comprised of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division Chief, State
Department officials, the National Security Council, and Treasury was created for the
implementation of the propaganda and economic action. The political action campaign in many
ways was a defeat as it failed to convince Frei to get behind the plan and work with the US, Frei
seemed too dedicated to his country’s values. The Committee is essentially the governing body
for the CIA. In an ideal world, all agencies would work together, so the 40 Committee would be
approving joint ventures for the State and CIA. As is noted in the Congressional Report 42, the
CIA should coordinate with the State Department before submitting proposals to the 40
Committee. But as we will see, there were huge differences of opinion with regards as to
course of action in Chile within the Committee itself.
The 40 Committee was chaired by Henry Kissinger, and a NY Times article from 1975 43
quotes the hearing of Mr. William Colby, who was former DCI, by Senator Symington. The
testimony is as follows;
-

Senator Symington: Who is the chairman?
Mr. Colby: Well, again, I would prefer to go into executive session on the description of
the Forty Committee, Mr. Chairman.
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-

Senator Symington (incredulous): As to who is the chairman, you would prefer an
executive session?
Mr. Colby: The chairman, all right, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kissinger is the chairman as the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

When thinking about the amount of time it took for the president and his colleagues to
heed the advice of the intelligence community and the work they had already been doing in the
region prior to his presidential oath, one can understand that Vietnam was Nixon’s main
priority. Up to this point I have simply reviewed the environment that was already present in
Chile. The Right and Left in Chile were extremely polarized. By highlighting the inner workings
of the Chilean political system that the Allende regime came into we can better understand the
exact role that the US had in its downfall.. By applying the right pressure on Chilean society, a
proper environment for a coup was created by Nixon and his administration. Even though there
was no direct Soviet threat, nor an expansion of Allende’s revolution to other parts of Latin
America, Nixon and Kissinger still played the cool public posture yet also engaged in extensive
covert activities. All of those factors plus the strangling of the Chilean economy, exacerbating
the turmoil already being felt by the economy led to the perfect climate in which the US did not
have to tell anyone how or what to do. The setting was already set and whether the US
believed it or not, Chile was ripe for the picking.
CHAPTER 4: THE TRACKS TO DERAILMENT
4.1 – TRACK I
The 40 Committee officially approved the plans for Track I following the September 14th
meeting in 1970. This track had three subsections to it including, political action, a propaganda
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campaign, as well as economic pressures. The beginning phase to this track consisted of a
deceivingly constitutional method to ensure Allende stayed out of office, while at the same
time implementing a candidate in the US’ favor. Both the 40 Committee and the CIA agreed
that the “Frei re-election gambit”44 was a sound means to an end. What is interesting here is
that Track I becomes reality only after Allende wins the plurality and the election will go a
Congressional vote. But the original idea actually dates back to 1968 when the US, was too
easily influenced by past successes. Meaning the US was a little too quick to get on their high
horse and compare foreign policy tools and make the wrongful claim that it will work again
same as before. As a CIA memo45 dated April 1968 from William Broe to Henry Karamessines
notifies him of the initial plan for Track I:
“Using information and analyses provided by the Embassy's political section as well as from the
Station has begun to put together a political action program to be carried out within the
context of the overt effort. The final political action proposal will be a joint Station/Embassy
effort with the Ambassador playing the key role.”
The plan for Track I was in a way, similar to the Kennedy years in which various agencies
acted as the brains and brawn of US foreign policy. Over the weeks that unfolded, not much of
a dent was made into Chile following the Frei re-election gambit and Nixon decided it was time
for another route. The propaganda campaign and the economic pressures had a profound
impact upon the coup climate. In many ways this was the right way to influence mass sectors of
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the population. With the State Department and Ambassador Korry left out of the loop for these
phases, it seems evident that Nixon hoped to begin the coup process covertly. By producing
propaganda and supporting certain groups already established in Chilean society, the CIA
“sought to create concerns about Chiles future if Allende were elected; the propaganda was
designed to influence Frei, the elite, and the military”46. When the first political pressure option
failed the 40 Committee took to imposing an economic offensive against Chile, which consisted
of cutting off all international credits to Chile as well as pressuring firms to reduce investment
in Chilean businesses and infrastructure. Ultimately Track I failed to generate the economic
crisis that it so desperate craved, and thus failed to stimulate the Chilean military to take
serious action against Allende. So clearly both the State Department and the CIA were aware of
this track and had set it upon their respective agendas, but it failed to materialize into anything
substantial.
4.2 – TRACK II
Richard Helms was directed by President Nixon to prevent Allende from taking power,
and that this effort was to be “conducted without the knowledge of the Departments of State
and Defense or the Ambassador”. Track II was also never discussed at a formal 40 Committee
meeting. This track in reality, was the end all be all game, either coup or no coup. Track II
consisted of US officials bribing/convincing Chilean military leaders to take up a coup against
Allende and his government. On November 18th, 1970, there was a Report on CIA Chilean Task
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Force Activities that was put out. Within this document it is explicitly stated that “On 15
September, 1970, CIA was directed to try to prevent Marxist Salvador Allende’s assent to the
Chilean presidency on 3 November. This effort was to be independent of concurrent endeavors
being undertaken through, or with the knowledge of, the 40 Committee, Department of State,
and Ambassador Korry.”47. This intelligence brief also displays the fact that Frei was not
responding positively to US desires for a military coup, it is decided that whether or not Frei
was on board, the Agency would move forward with its contacts within the Chilean military.
While Track I and II were different routes, they had the same basic outcome, a military coup
that removed Allende from office. The difference of Track II stems from its exclusion of the
Departments of State and Defense and without the knowledge of Ambassador Korry. Track I did
have the coup aspect to it, but it was hinged on the concurrence of Frei. At the end of the day
neither of the Tracks accomplished the intended goal of preventing Allende from taking office,
but each Track had left significant imprints upon the already strained Chilean society.
What is significant to note from the 1975 Senate Report, is that for Track II the CIA was
using its own direct contacts with the Chilean military, and was not contingent upon approval
from Frei, nor the State Department. It is said in the report that “it was to be known only to a
small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA”48. So while we can see that in the
instance of Track II development, Nixon and Kissinger believed it imperative that if a coup were
to work and work well, it needed be done strictly under CIA guidance. At the end of the day,

Central Intelligence Agency, Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November
1970 (Washington, DC, 1970), [pg. 1].
48 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963- 1973, 94th Cong., 1st. sess., December 18, 1975., p.
26
47

38
both Tracks failed to gain the ground the US was so badly losing. Certain elements within the
Chilean army were actively involved in coup plotting, and at one point were receiving funds
from the CIA, but Kissinger pulled the plug on these plans and they never got off the ground
with active US support.
CHAPTER 5: NIXONS POLICIES AND HIS AFFECT ON CHILEAN SOCIETY
5.1 – THE CLIMATE
While Nixon’s original to deny Allende the presidency during the campaign period did
not go according to plan, the administration did not relinquish their hold on the situation. In
fact, the exact opposite occurred. In the face of defeat at Track I and II, Nixon and his
administration decided that an economic blockade would influence society and express to the
Chilean population that Allende could not deliver on his promises. Prior to Allende’s election in
1970, International Development Bank loans totaling $46 million had been approved but only
$2 million were approved during the entirety of his presidency. The World Bank had approved
$31 million in loans during the Frei government between 1969 and 1970 but not a dime was
lent between 1971 and 1973. Bilateral U.S. assistance from AID dropped from $110 million
between 1968 and 1970 to $3 million between 1971 and 1973. The U.S. Export Import Bank
went from lending almost $280 million between 1967 and 1970 to nothing in 1971 49 What this
did, was strangle the Chilean economy, which still had over $1 billion in debts left from the Frei
administration.
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While it appeared that the European countries were willing to help Chile with their
massive debt, the US was not going to budge. While the outright foreign policy of the US
towards Chile at this time was attempting to weaken the Chilean economy and limit the
flexibility of the Allende regime, the CIA engaged in covert operations to try and weaken the
support for Allende, while aiding the other political parties against Allende. Not only did the CIA
provide financial support to the Christian Democrat Party, but it also provided support to the
National Party and the Democratic Radical Party. In 1972 a total of $1,602,666 was
appropriated to the CIA to covertly finance opposition campaigns. In August 1973 another
$1,000,000 was provided to continue covert efforts to strengthen opposition political parties
and private sector organizations opposed to Allende 50. In addition to the strengthening of the
opposition parties, the CIA undertook a massive propaganda campaign against the Allende
administration. The campaign consisted of funding a very staunch right-wing newspaper named
El Mercurio. The paper ran continuous articles to pressure and encourage the opposition
against the Allende government, accusing his administration of attempting to nationalize banks,
violating freedom of the press, and land seizures.
El Mercurio exposed every possible tension between the government and the
democratic opposition and emphasized the problems and conflicts developing between the
government and the armed forces. It was through this level of integration with the localities
that CIA realized it would not be enough to just run newspaper ads smearing the Allende
regime. The CIA was quick to realize that they would need the support of the military to actually
enact the coup President Nixon so desperately wanted.
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An article from the NY Times51 in 1974 reviews the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and Kissinger’s testimony before its members. According to Kissinger, the CIA’s and State
Departments involvement in Chile had solely been to keep certain political parties and media
outlets alive that were threatened by Allende’s presidential victory. According to the Times,
“Among those heavily subsidized, were the organizers of a nationwide truck strike that lasted
26 days in the fall of 1972, seriously disrupting Chile's economy and provoking the first of a
series of labor crises for President Allende” and that “at its peak, the 1973 strikes involved more
than 250,000 truck drivers, shopkeepers and professionals who banded to gather in a middle‐
class movement that, many analysts have concluded, made a violent overthrow inevitable.”. So
while we see even from this testimony of Kissinger, the US actively supported certain
marginalized groups, which in a way supported the coup. While the US did not have a direct
hand in the organization and carrying out of the military coup, by enabling the disenfranchised
groups of Chilean society to rally behind General Pinochet.
5.2 – WAS NIXON SUCCESSFUL?
Based on all the information available, we can now fully take account of what transpired
in Chile during this time period, and the greater effects. It would be too polite to think of
Nixon’s policy toward Chile as successful. Nixon tried from the very beginning to initiate a coup
to overthrow Allende. As we know, all of those plans failed. The larger picture though, was
actually painted quite masterfully. While the propaganda campaigns, the economic blockade,
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and the coup-plotting did not rid Nixon of Allende, it certainly helped apply the right pressure
on an already fractured Chilean society. The key moment in this entire era, can be seen in the
economic blockade. Chile already had acquired massive debt under Frei, and the Chilean people
were now feeling the full force of it when the US halted most aid. The money going into
opposition parties and media also played a huge role in the setting of the stage for the eventual
coup.
I believe, here, it is not so much was Nixon successful, but rather in what was capacity
were his policies successful if we keep the bigger picture in mind. While I do not in any way
attempt to justify the atrocity that Nixon was setting the Chilean people up for, it needs to be
said that the US’ actual hand in the armed revolt and the establishment of Pinochet’s bloody
military regime is slim. The way to properly view US involvement in Chile is through the
implementation of certain ideological reinforcements; whether they be purposeful or
accidentally planted, in the Chilean mind. This point can especially be seen in the subsidized
groups that are mentioned above.
CHAPTER 6: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM CHILE
6.1 -- STRUCTURE OF US FOREIGN POLICY
In the 1960’s when Eduardo Frei was running for the presidency, President Kennedy
avidly supported him and his Christian Democrats. The Kennedy Administration supplied him
with ample monetary support as well as planning support for how to obtain the presidency. The
Kennedy Administration also dealt with this problem with plenty of time to spare, and with that
knowledge the US As is stated in the Helms Testimony: “In other words, just getting behind the
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candidate, giving him money and support…and enough in advance so they actually did some
good… I think this was going on a year or two before the election”52. So from this one account
of Richard Helms we can understand that the previous decision to support the Frei campaign
was handled promptly and efficiently by the administration at the time. But the same was not
the case for the attempt to block Salvador Allende from office in the 1970’s. As Helms notes in
the same testimony, “in ’70 there was a desire to suddenly, at a very late date, to do something
because it suddenly dawned on the Administration that Allende might easily come to power.”.
Helms states as well that it was just too little too late for the Administration to do anything
effective about Allende. He refers to the case with Frei and reminds the Committee that when
Kennedy planned to support Frei, there was plenty of time to come up with a route and a plan
of action and then everything fell into place. The difference in methodology between the Frei
and Allende election, is a result of poor timing and operational planning/awareness by part of
the Nixon Administration. If Nixon had either intervened earlier than he did, or had not
intervened at all like some officials from the State Department had wanted, Chile would have
been in a very different boat.
In May of 1968, William Broe, chief of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division suggested
that the US should intervene in the 1969 Congressional elections, realizing their importance for
the upcoming September 1970 election. Broe said “these elections [were] all-important since
their outcome [would] determine the nature of the party alliances that [would] be formed in
connection with the presidential election of September 1970.” 53 Taking Broe’s advice into
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consideration the US initiated a covert operation to affect the outcome of the 1969
Congressional elections, and around the same time the second National Intelligence Estimate
was released on Chile in January of 1969. What is shocking from the fact that Broe had to
suggested this plan of action is that the US had lost touch on what was going on in Chile.
Especially when you consider the amount of interest taken by the Kennedy administration to
ensure Frei was elected in 1964. The level of commitment or lack thereof, by both State and CIA
could be considered one of the fatal flaws of US intelligence during this time. The Kennedy
administration did such a fantastic job of helping finance and support the Frei administration to
ensure his victory over Allende, and it is not hard to imagine that with proper time and
resources, the same result could have held in this election as well.
The Chilean case is significant for many reasons. There is the first and maybe most
important one, of whether Nixon made the right call or not. We know that the US did not have
a hand in the coup per se, that it was done via General Pinochet and his military personnel, but
the US did channel support to military officials prior to the coup itself. The next issue is that
who was right; the CIA or State Department. We see that the State Department was adamant
about not getting involved whatsoever, and that they were actively left out of the discussion of
Track II. In September of 1970, the Chilean Congress rejected a parliamentary maneuver to
block Allende's inauguration. CIA operatives in Santiago then began to canvass a move by the
Chilean military. But the CIA quickly backed off. The military, which three years later had a
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different view, refused in 1970 to intrude on the constitutional process. The CIA so reported to
Kissinger, then National Security Adviser, and on October 15, 1970, he ended U.S. involvement
in the anti-Allende plotting. Kissinger later told the president, "This thing looked hopeless. I
turned it off. Nothing could be worse than an abortive coup” 54 But, according to the Church
Commission's report, when CIA operatives relayed the turn-off instruction to the Chilean army,
the plotters responded that they were going ahead anyway.
Regardless of what Kissinger said, it is easy to understand that the US desired a military
coup and saw it as the only way to remove Allende from office, so while it might have ended, in
reality the US just left it to the Chilean military officials. As we saw from the evidence above,
Tracks I and II, as well as all the pre-election propaganda that the US funded and supported,
had a huge impact on the already polarized Chilean society. Mark Falcoff writes perfectly in his
2003 article that “the thrust of U.S. policy shifted to sustaining a democratic opposition and an
independent press”55. So while the coup of 1973 was not directly done by US hands, it had a
huge role in the climate that led the eventual coup. Nixon’s administration collapsed the
Chilean economy as well as further deepening the divide of the political parties, and in the end
Allende’s administration brought about their eventual overthrow by sitting in water tainted
with US dirt.
A TelCon dated September 16, 2973 between Kissinger and Nixon shows exactly what
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they did. They admit it. It is not that long of a conversation, but it is so significant I need to put
it in here. The conversation is as follows:

-

Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there?
Kissinger: The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers and
bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.
Nixon: Isn’t that something.
Kissinger: In the Eisenhower period we would be hero’s.
Nixon: Well we didn’t – as you know – our hand doesn’t show on this one.
Kissinger: We didn’t do it. I mean we helped them. Created the conditions as great as
possible.
Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played.

Not only is this such damning and incriminating proof, but everything I have said above,
from the propaganda, to economic sanctions, to opposition party support, now all said in the
words of the two puppet-masters themselves.

6.2 – INTELLIGENCE VS DIPLOMACY
Upon my review of the William Colby Testimony before the Church Committee in 1975,
as well as the Richard Helms Testimony before a Senate Subcommittee in the same year the
way in which foreign policy comes to fruition becomes more clear. Helms says that the officials
in the Nixon Administration were not concerned with Chile, “They were preoccupied with
Vietnam and things of that sort, openings to China and the Soviet Union.”. The case of Chile and
the US foreign policy that shaped its route for years to follow is not a needle in a haystack by
any means. The US has had its hand in multiple bags all over the world. The case of Chile, does
however, illustrate the relationship between formal diplomacy and covert intelligence. Both act

46
as a means to the end, but in the case of Chile, the means do not necessarily justify the ends. As
we see from the conversation between Kissinger and Nixon, that because the certain steps
were not taken in the beginning, the coup was going to fail. But it is because of those hurried
steps the administration took, that we see the climate that was cultivated by Nixon and
Kissinger.
One thing I really want to highlight here is the intelligence community and their role in
all of this. It is apparent that the CIA had significant pull in the decision making process. Now
this can fall upon a number of factors, such as personal agendas, of say The President, Richard
Nixon. In the Helms Testimony, Helms puts it perfectly when talking on the way in which
foreign policy is very much a top down kind of thing. Helms recalls that:
“People at the top policy levels weren’t paying much attention to Chile… This is an aspect of
government that we could spend two minutes on, and that is that government tends to run by
the perceptions of a President and what his interests are, and its extraordinarily difficult to get
things for other things.”56
What we can learn from Chile and the way the US handled it, is actually rather simple
when it all boils down. Officials in positions of power, meaning real power to initiate policy,
need to be really listening to the advice of their intelligence apparatus. We clearly see a lack of
concern over Chile until it is far too late. When viewing the abortive coup in 1970, and all the
ramped up work the US did trying to push on its behalf, the 1973 junta leaders probably felt
validated that Nixon had essentially left them in charge. Now only years in the future can we
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fully understand the essence and blunders of these events, but the lessons still hold true. Heed
the warning of your intelligence, and enable those around you to be a part of how you digest
said intelligence. The substantive take-away from this relates back to the proper relationship
between intelligence agencies and diplomatic agencies, the way in which they should feed off
one another and unite to properly handle world events. The disagreement between State
Department and CIA demonstrates that when at wits-end, very fine aspects of policy come
under fire and are even lost. Ultimately, the 1973 coup in Chile should make policy-makers and
intelligence officials more wary of the effect rushed work has on world events.
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